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B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company,
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Cross-Petitioner
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
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State of Utah,
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REPLY ARGUMENT
I
A COMPENSABLE "TAKING" HAS OCCURRED BY REASON
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEDICATION AND
INSTALLED IMPROVEMENTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
STANDARDS OF THE NOLLAN-DOLAN FRAMEWORK,
REGARDLESS OF THE CLAIMED "LEGISLATIVE" FOUNDATION
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTING THE "TAKING"
The COUNTY opens its REPLY BRIEF with the rather
cavalier statement that this case is so unique, so
sophisticated

and

so

precise

that

it

presents

a

question of "first impression" and that there are no
other cases nationally on this issue. The COUNTY is
simply

incorrect

in

that

assessment

of

the

jurisprudential landscape.
In reality, there are at least three "cases" which
have direct bearing and application to the "takings"

1

claims

raised

in

this

"inverse

condemnation"

litigation. The first and second of these cases are
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission 483 US 825, 97
LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan"],
and Dolan vs City of Tigard (1994), 512 US 374, 129
Led2d 304, 114 Set 2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"].
Those decisions of the United States Supreme Court
identify and apply "constitutional principles" which
although the COUNTY does not want to follow those
principles

have direct and dispositive application to

the situation-at-hand. Nollan and Dolan essentially
"speak for themselves": their applicability to the
instant

situation

is

more

than

obvious

the

identification of any interpretative decisions of lower
courts is not only unnecessary, but according to the
COUNTY

such

assertion

additional

cases

do

not

exist.

i.e. that there are no other cases

[The
is

strongly disputed by B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT. The cases are
numerous, almost numberless. But we needn't "go there"
because

of

the

relative

simplicity

of

the

constitutional principle (i.e "just compensation" for
"property taken" for "public use") involved.]
The "third" appellate court decision of relevance
is the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this
case: namely, B.A.M. Development/ L.L.C. vs Salt Lake
2
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REPLY ARGUMENT
I
A COMPENSABLE "TAKING" HAS OCCURRED BY REASON
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEDICATION AND
INSTALLED IMPROVEMENTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
STANDARDS OF THE NOLLAN-DOLAN FRAMEWORK,
REGARDLESS OF THE CLAIMED "LEGISLATIVE" FOUNDATION
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTING THE "TAKING"
The COUNTY opens its REPLY BRIEF with the rather
cavalier statement that this case is so unique, so
sophisticated

and

so

precise

that

it

presents

a

question of "first impression" and that there are no
other cases nationally on this issue. The COUNTY is
simply

incorrect

in

that

assessment

of

the

jurisprudential landscape.
In reality, there are at least three "cases" which
have direct bearing and application to the "takings"

1

County, 2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004)
[hereinafter "the Decision"] . Therein, each of the
three judges of the Court of Appeals recognized the
obvious applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework to
the situation-at-hand. Judge ORME

albeit in dissent,

but only because of the Court of Appeals "wanderings"
(undersigned's terminology) into uncharted territory
from the unappealed, unbriefed "administrative remand"
issue

now

conceded

inappropriately

by

the

decided

COUNTY

wrote

a

to

have

been

scholarly

and

masterful decision on the "just compensation" aspects
of the case. The Supreme Court would be prudent to
follow the jurisprudential precedent set by Judge ORME
of the Court of Appeals. He "nailed it".
The
literally

"constitutional
"boiled

essence" of

down"

to

the

this

case is

COUNTY'S

written

observations, although the COUNTY'S conclusions totally
miss the mark, as contained

in pages 5-6

of the

COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF, thus:
The highway-dedication ordinance at issue
here,
involves
a generally
applicable
legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not
one which is imposed
or which can be
imposed
individually.
As with any developer
who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a
highway, BAM was required here to comply with
a uniform legislative scheme which expects all
similarly
situated
developers
[footnote
omitted] to dedicate highway rights-of-way
consistent with current uniform road-width
standards.
Such
a uniform
scheme
is
3

fundamental to ensuring that community
development occurs in accordance with sensible
long-range transportation planning. Otherwise,
under BAM's view of the law, road-width
requirements for new construction along major
traffic corridors would vary radically from
parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size,
usage, and other impact characteristics of
each individual parcel. In practical effect,
an "individualized" impact analysis would
require a different road-width dedication for
every single parcel located along the side of
a highway. Rather than having roadways with
even and consistent widths, road boundaries
would be required to jut in and out in front
of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an
"individualized
determination"
of
each
parcel's traffic impact. The absurd practical
consequences of this application of Dolan
"rough proportionality" in such a case are
obvious.
Pages 5-6 of COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF. Italicized text in
original. Citation to footnote omitted.
The "picture" the COUNTY thus "paints" has the
following obvious features, which the COUNTY seemingly
ignores:
1.

ONLY

singled

"highway-abutting"
out

for

requirement.

The

similarly-situated

the

parcels

roadway

development
parcels

are

dedication
of

other

"similarly-

situated" approached not in terms of "highwayabutting" but rather generally in terms of
creating

the

same

impact

(i.e. vehicular

traffic added to the roadway infrastructure) --ARE

EXEMPT

from

any
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require.
What the COUNTY in its self-serving "constitutional
myopia" is refusing to recognize, but which the COURT
will readily acknowledge, is that there is another
potential result, namely, that the Government can have
roadways
Government

of

whatever

must

pay

width
"just

it

chooses,

but

the

compensation"

for

the

property interests it "takes"
Understood

substance

and

procedure, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance has

in

fact and in law

in

its

essential

as its transparent purpose, "the

avoidance of the Just Compensation requirement". The
Ordinance, rather than being

legitimized,

is thus

condemned, as the United States Supreme Court in Nollan
wrote:
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction converts that purpose to
something other than what it was. The purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of
an easement to serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation.
Whatever may be the outer limits of
"legitimate state interests" in the takings
and land-use context, this is not one of them.
In short, unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental purpose
as the
development ban, the building restriction is
not a valid regulation of land use but "an
out-and-out plan of extortion."
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. Citation to cases
omitted.
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, issue is

not appealed. Or, nobody else woula be quite

or bold, or constitutionally insensitive, to
advance

the

illogical

and

hypertechnical

argument the COUNTY has developed subsequent
to

trial,

for

justifications.

its
By

own
the

self-serving
COUNTY'S

own

description, it has painted itself into a
corner with its self-serving characterization
of what Dolan is really about.
In the

"headnote"

(title) to Point I of its

arguments contained in its REPLY BRIEF, the COUNTY
asserts

there

was

"no

unconstitutional

taking",

ostensibly because the "rough proportionality" test of
Dolan does not apply. The COUNTY thus misreads the
Dolan decision. First, the "rough proportionality" test
of Dolan is separate and apart from the "individualized
determination" test: the elements are separate and
distinct, and although both might be required, they are
not interchangeable with each other. Secondly, much of
the COUNTY'S argument incorrectly focuses upon the
"individualized determination" aspect of the test, as
though the two concepts were interchangeable, which
they aren't. So again, the COUNTY misanalyzes what
Dolan really says. The "constitutional" principle of
"rough proportionality" is constitutionally applicable
to all of these "takings" situations, even though in a
8

few limited situations (i.e. pure "impact fee" cases),
the "individualized determination" provisions may not
be directly applicable or implicated

but only because

of the rather unique method in which "impact fees" are
derived and paid.
The

COUNTY'S

assertions

that

Dolan's

"individualized determination" element is inapplicable
to the "highway-abutting"

situation-at-hand

is not

merely intellectual, but lies at the core of this
"appeal", for very pragmatic reasons. At trial, and
before the Court of Appeals, the COUNTY argued that
NEITHER Nollan nor Dolan was applicable. Thus, the
COUNTY made no attempt to comply with the "burden of
proof" requirement of Dolan imposed upon the COUNTY: to
demonstrate
attempted
asserts
There

the
no

"rough

showing

proportionality".

whatsoever,

if

as

Having
B.A.M.

Dolan IS APPLICABLE, then the COUNTY loses.
is

neither

any

"rational

basis"

nor

"legitimate state interest" inherent in avoiding the
proscriptions of the Just Compensation Clause(s).
Dolan

is

"adjudicative"
CONSTITUTIONAL

not

merely

about

distinctions.

"legislative"
Dolan

PRINCIPLES---namely,

is

or

about

the payment of

"just compensation" for private property "taken for
public use". [A careful reading of Dolan will further
9

reveal

that

the

Tigard

City's

requirements, in part, were

"dedication"

indeed pursuant

to a

"legislative" scheme. Dolan and Nollan were decided on
the

basis

"taking"

of

constitutional

principle

ala,

a

not on the basis of which governmental body

initiated the taking. The "Just Compensation Clause" is
invoked in ANY "taking" context, regardless of whether
it is "administrative" or "legislative", if there is a
physical taking as there was in the B.A.M. situation.
In its REPLY BRIEF, the COUNTY re-characterizes the
true status of the previous cases it has cited in
support of its assertions. On page 7 (line 11) of its
REPLY BRIEF the County utilizes the term "exactions",
but then further explains that the previously-cited
cases "generally involve(d) payment of impact fees or
similar economic assessment". Page 7 of REPLY BRIEF of
COUNTY. For that reason alone

i.e. that the COUNTY-

cited cases were generally "impact fees" cases

is

sufficient to justify B.A.M.'s failure to respond: the
instant situation is a "actual physical takings" case--not an impact fees case

and the jurisprudential

logic applied to "impact fees" cases simply doesn't
apply.
The second problem with the COUNTY'S analysis is
the problem created by its own characterization of the
10

situation-at-hand. In seven years of litigation, the
COUNTY has failed to offer one meaningful justification
why the COUNTY feels the need to require "highwayabutting"

parcels,

upon

development

thereof,

to

dedicate and improve STATE HIGHWAYS falling under the
jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Transportation
[UDOT] . This issue is significant for a number of
factual and legal reasons:
1.

First,

because

the

COUNTY

expressly

rejected and denied B.A.M.'s pre-litigation
offer to postpone the dedication and postpone
the installation of the improvements, unless
and until UDOT would actually come in and make
the improvements, at which time UDOT would pay
"just

compensation"

for

the

real

estate

interests so "taken". [BAM's related offers to
plat and improve the developed "residential
lots" in a manner which would have allowed BAM
and/or the individualized lotowner to make the
"just compensation" claim against UDOT were
similarly REJECTED by the COUNTY, even BEFORE
the litigation was first filed.]
2.

If the COUNTY had allowed B.A.M.

to

postpone the dedication and the installation--which

postponement,
11

as

noted,

was

not

allowed
to

the

UDOT would have been clearly subj ect
"takings"

CONSTITUTIONAL

analysis

under

PROVISIONS

THE

THEMSELVES,

irrespective of the applicability of NolanDolan framework (i.e. dedication required as
a pre-condition to obtaining local government
development approval to build). Furthermore,
UDOT would have also been subject to the
provision of state statute, namely, Section
63-90-1 et seq, Utah Code, which MANDATES that
state agencies

including UDOT

not only

identify those "takings" situation and honor
the constitutional standards as contained in
interpretative

court

decisions,

but

goes

further to even state that the "takings" be in
"rough proportionality" (which the Court will
recognize as the Dolan standard) as to the
needs created, and so forth. Obviously, UDOT
is not in the regular practice of issuing
"development approval"; such is a function of
units of
their

local government
unincorporated

counties

(for

areas)

and

municipalities. The "bottom line" principle
nevertheless is that the COUNTY ignored the
practical effect of the statute and required
12

unconstitutional dedications and improvements,
which

UDOT

was

constitutionally

and/or

statutorily prohibited from requiring. The
Utah Legislature, in numerous locations, has
enacted statutory provisions affirmatively
recognizing

particularly subsequent to the

1987 Nollan decision

the

"constitutional

takings" issues. The 2005 LUDMA, adopted by
the

Legislature,

incorporates

Dolan-type

language "rough proportionality" as being the
standard of measure for "exactions" by county
government. See Section 37 of Senate Bill 60
[2005] , page 47-48. The COUNTY seems to be the
only jurisdiction which "somehow hasn't quite
yet got it".[Even though UDOT was, arguably,
the intended beneficiary of the excessive,
unconstitutional "takings", the COUNTY, which
intentionally effected such "takings", should
provide the "just compensation" therefor.]
The COUNTY further mischaracterizes and mis-casts
the nature of the B.A.M. claims, and then purports to
come to a conclusion explaining away those claims. [The
Court will be well-aware of this rhetorical device.]
The COUNTY asserts [page 1 of its REPLY BRIEF] that
B.A.M. is not so much concerned with the "quantity" of
13

the COUNTY'S purported

taking, as opposed

to its

"quality". The COUNTY'S statement is thus:
A key problem with BAM's analysis is its
emphasis on the quantity of the County's
purported taking, as opposed to its quality.
Stated otherwise, BAM is preoccupied with
degree rather than kind. Yet it is the kind,
or quality, of the highway right-of-way
dedication
not the degree to which it
impacted BAM
that distinguishes this case
from others.
REPLY BRIEF of the COUNTY, page 1. Emphasis in original
text.

The

COUNTY

misapprehends

and

misconstrues

B.A.M.'s position on both issues: B.A.M. is concerned
with

BOTH

the

"quantity"

(i.e. in

terms

of

the

"excessive" nature of the required "dedications and
improvements installations"), as well as the "quality"
(i.e. that the dedications and improvements arise from
the

claimed

"uniform",

unyielding

Ordinance

provisions). It makes little difference or distinction
to B.A.M. the particular basis as to how its property
is

unconstitutionally

"taking"

"taken".

An

uncompensated

unconstitutional, regardless of method

is

still a "taking".
B.A.M.'s position always was and continues to be
that the CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES embodied within the
national and state constitutions are controlling and
the self-serving distinction of "administrative" (or
"adjudicative") as contrasted with "legislative" has NO
14

CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.
B.A.M.
regardless

is

detrimentally

of the basis

impacted

either

the COUNTY asserts

way,
as a

justification for the "taking": indeed, before the
District Court, the COUNTY had asserted that NEITHER
Nollan nor Dolan applied to the case-at-hand. That same
argument (non-applicability of Nollan and Dolan) was
advanced by the COUNTY in its arguments before the
Court of Appeals. In its familiar flip-flop fashion,
the COUNTY now concedes that Nolan IS APPLICABLE (but
has been satisfied), but that Dolan is inapplicable.
[B.A.M. believes and asserts that Nollan and Dolan are
absolutely intertwined, and that the United States
Supreme Court intended (with Dolan) that Dolan be read
TOGETHER WITH Nollan (and as a supplement to Nollan!
The COUNTY conveniently ignores the holdings and
statements of the United States Supreme Court involving
"physical

occupations

and

actual

takings"

(as

contrasted with "regulatory takings"). For example, in
Loretto vs Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, 4 58
US 419, 73 LEd2d 868, 102 SCt 3164 (1982), the United
States Supreme Court held that the statutorily-required
installation of a cable-television circuit junction
box,

of

only

a couple

privately-held property

cubic

feet

in size, upon

(wall of apartment house),
15

constituted a "taking" for constitutional purposes. If
"cable television junction box" affixed to wall of an
apartment house is a "taking", then certainly the
coerced dedication of thousands and thousands of square
feet of real estate and the tens of thousands of
dollars of "excessive" improvements constitutes
constitutional purposes

for

a "taking". Later-announced

cases consistently support the Loretto holding. See
Palazzolo vs Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d 592,
121 SCt 2448 (2001), as discussed in B.A.M.'s OPENING
BRIEF.
II
ISSUE #2: ADMINISTRATIVE REMAND
Notwithstanding
acknowledgement
ARGUMENTS

the
[as

COUNTY'S

contained

in

affirmative
its

POINT

#3

that Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, carves

out an "exception" to the "administrative hearing"
requirements], the COUNTY argues for almost two pages
(out

of

its

15-page

REPLY

"administrative

remand"

portions

BRIEF)
of

the

that
Court

the
of

Appeals decision are correct and make sense, but that
such provisions (of the Court of Appeals Decision) are
implicitly incorrect. However, in the end, the COUNTY
without unconditionally

saying as much, implicitly

concedes the "administrative remand" portion of the
16

Decision was incorrect.
The

Court

of

Appeals

decision

was,

on

the

"administrative remand" issue, wrong and incorrect
for the simple reason that it failed to apprehend the
provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code. Such a
situation arose because the issue wasn't raised as an
issue in the pleadings, wasn't raised on appeal, and
until the Court of Appeals actually issued its ruling,
wasn't before the parties (or the Court of Appeals, for
that matter). The COUNTY having conceded as much, it
makes little sense for the Supreme Court to spend any
time on Issue #2 [the administrative remand issue].
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court is nevertheless
affirmatively requested to EXPRESSLY state and overrule
those

portions

of

the

Court

of Appeals

decision

pertaining to the "administrative remand"

namely,

Paragraphs 6 through 10, inclusively, of the Decision,
if only for the following reasons:
1.

To do justice and to clearly establish

"law of the case" principles, on the basis
that the District Court's judgment in favor of
the COUNTY is overturned and the case remanded
back to the District Court for judgment to be
entered in favor of B.A.M. on the basis of the
Nollan-Dolan criteria.
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2.

To set the status of "the law of Utah"

with respect to "inverse condemnation" cases
as not being "on-the-record" at the District
Court

stage.

If

such

correction

is

not

expressly undertaken by the Supreme Court,
practitioners and judges arguably will have a
mistaken view of "the law" with respect to how
"inverse condemnation" cases are actually to
be tried.
In somewhat

similar vein, the

"administrative

remand" analysis and discussion is arguably rendered
"moot"

by

the

Legislature

subsequent

adoption

by

the

2005

of Senate Bill No. 60, adopting the Utah

Land Use Development and Management Act [abbreviated
"LUDMA"] , a 192-page legislation which incorporated new
statutory

provisions

which

supersede

the previous

statutory provisions, upon which the Court of Appeals
Decision was based.

[The "SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS"

document filed by B.A.M. as to the effect of LUDMA has
been separately filed, essentially simultaneous with
the filing of this REPLY BRIEF.] The Court should
nevertheless be cognizant of the fact that although
LUDMA made sweeping and comprehensive changes in how
"land-use" decisions are made and are litigated, there
were no changes to how "inverse condemnation" cases are
18

to be filed and litigated. Thus, the provisions of
Section 63-90a-4 are STILL CONTROLLING, as the COUNTY
now seemingly concedes, but still doesn't quite want to
admit it clearly.
Thus, for the party-litigants in this case in
specific, it makes no sense for the Court to engage in
lengthy discussion or analysis of the "administrative
remand" issues which the COUNTY implicitly admits was
incorrectly

decided,

notwithstanding

the

COUNTY'S

continuing inability to affirmatively state as much in
clear terms. It makes absolutely no sense to "remand"
the case back to the District Court for remand to the
County "administrative hearing officer", now that the
County concedes the issue.
For the foregoing reasons (the inherent wrongness
of the Court of Appeals Decision on the "administrative
remand" issue, as well as the 2005 legislative adoption
of LUDMA), any Supreme Court discussion of the former
provisions of the state statutes would be, in the
opinion of the undersigned, meaningless (i.e. there no
longer exists any "case and controversy" on this narrow
issue): any guidance for practitioners and subordinate
courts, FOR FUTURE CASES, is unnecessary

but for the

"correcting" nature of the Supreme Court's analysis, as
deemed appropriate.
19

B
"AMICUS"-IDENTIFIED ISSUES
RELATED TO THE "ADMINISTRATIVE REMAND"
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT gratefully acknowledges the
insightful
Property

efforts undertaken by the Utah Private
Ombudsman,

as

"amicus"

in

this

case:

particularly those efforts which have identified and
supported

the Nollan-Dolan

framework

as being THE

analytical standard to be applied herein. However,
given the COUNTY'S ostensible "concession" that the
"administrative remand" issue [certified "Issue #2] was
improperly decided, except for the necessity of the
Supreme Court "correcting" (for this case alone) the
Court of Appeals Decision, there is no necessity for
the Court to delve into some of the other issues the
"amicus" has identified.
Ill
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63-90a-4
ARE CONTROLLING AND DISPOSITIVE
A
THE COUNTY CONCEDES THE APPLICABILITY
AND DISPOSITIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 63-90a-4
The COUNTY now concedes that the provisions of
Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, in the context of "inverse
condemnation"

actions

asserting

"unconstitutional

takings claims" are applicable and controlling to the
case-at-hand.

Thus,

no

additional
20

argument

is

necessary.
Except for the Court to briefly
expressly

but nevertheless

note the reasons why the Supreme

Court

might want to identify why the Decision itself was
incorrectly decided by the Court of Appeals, exhaustive
discussion

of

the

issue

is

neither

warranted

nor

expected.
B
THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 63-90a-4
WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Although the COUNTY concedes NOW the applicability
of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, the COUNTY
argues

i.e.

"objects"

that B.A.M.

further

should not be

allowed to raise Section 63-90a-4 as a dispositive
issue. The COUNTY asserts that B.A.M. failed to present
the applicability of Section 63-90a-4 to the Court of
Appeals, and takes issue with B.A.M.'s statement that
the issue was presented to the Court of Appeals in its
"petition for rehearing". Because on this point the
issue (and point to be made thereon) is so absolutely
critical

(i.e. candor before a tribunal), BAM quotes

extensively from the COUNTY'S "REPLY BRIEF", thus:
BAM correctly argues that the Court of
Appeals' decision "overlooked" the application
of Sec. 63-90a-4 to this case. It is true that
the Court of Appeals did not discuss the
application of Section 63-90a-4. However, this
is because BAM never raised this issue in the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the County objects to
21

Supreme Court consideration of this issue on
the grounds that the issue was Sec. 63-90a-4
was not properly preserved below. BAM argues
that application of Sec. 63-90a-4 arose from
the Court of Appeals' decision which developed
the "administrative hearing and record" issue
sua sponte, not at the suggestion of either
party. However, BAM then erroneously states
that
" [e]ven
when
the
obvious
applicability of Section 63-90a-4
was brought to the Court of Appeals'
attention (in the context of the
'petition for rehearing'), the Court
of Appeals ultimately declined to
consider the same."
BAM Op. Brief at 46. Thus, BAM implies that it
raised Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for
Rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals on
March 5, 2004. In actuality, BAM never
mentioned Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for
Rehearing. In twenty-three pages of argument
for rehearing, BAM exhaustively reargued its
case, but nowhere did it invoke the provisions
of Sec. 63-90a-4. Thus, BAM should be
precluded from raising the issue of Sec. 6390a-4 first (sic) the first time in this
Court.
However, if the Supreme Court chooses to
consider
this
issue
on
its
merits
notwithstanding the lack of preservation
below, it appears that Sec. 63-90a-4 applies
to this case. . . .
COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF, pages

11-12. Emphasis

added.

Footnote citation omitted.
The original 23-page "Petition for Rehearing" was
devoid of any reference to Section 63-90a-4. However,
that

originally-filed

"petition

for

rehearing"

was

replaced and "substituted" and the COUNTY knows that;
the COUNTY affirmatively responded to the "substituted"
petition! The COUNTY has thus
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before

the

Supreme

Court

engaged in a "play on words", which although

technically

accurate

nevertheless

intentionally

presents a distorted procedural picture, particularly
in its "legal" conclusion to be drawn therefrom (i.e.
the Supreme Court should not consider the issue). The
COUNTY'S assertions (that 63-90a-4 was NOT presented to
the Court of Appeals in the "petition for rehearing"
context)
constitute

are

simply

an

but

intentional

absolutely

false

and

misrepresentation

and

distortion of the truth.
B.A.M.'s original "Petition for Rehearing" was
filed with the Court of Appeals on or about 5 March
2004; the "brief" (petition) was 23 pages long and was
"non-conforming"

(due to the excessive page length

limitation of 15 pages) . On or about 18 March 2004
B.A.M.'s undersigned counsel applied for "leave of
court" to file a "substitute" petition for rehearing,
specifically to include Section 63-90a-4. [A photocopy
of the B.A.M. motion is included herein at APPENDIX
#1.] The Court of Appeals, in response to the B.A.M.
motion, issued an Order (on or about 22 March 2004),
authorizing the "substitute" petition for rehearing.
[APPENDIX #2]. B.A.M. filed the "substitute" petition
for

rehearing.

[See

APPENDIX

#3,

which

contains

relevant excerpts of the filed petition, pertaining to
2^

63-90a-4]. The COUNTY thereafter (1 April 2004) filed
its responsive "brief", entitled "APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM
IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S SUBSTITUTED PETITION FOR
REHEARING".

Emphasis

added.

[See

APPENDIX

#4,

containing excerpts from the COUNTY'S "brief".] The
COUNTY argued that "Section 63-90a-4 has no relevance
to this Case" [page 3 of COUNTY'S "brief"; page 5 of
APPENDIX #4] and thereafter took the better part of
five and one-half pages

(pages 3 through 8 of the

COUNTY'S "brief") to assert that point.
Obviously, B.A.M. did
the applicability

in fact and in law

raise

of Section 63-90a-4. The COUNTY

affirmatively responded thereto before the Court of
Appeals. To imply

no, to affirmatively state, as the

COUNTY

otherwise,

has

reference

done

to the

"23-page

through

the

oblique

(original) petition for

rehearing" as though that brief were THE operative
"petition" upon which the Court of Appeals acted
intentionally

misleading

towards

this

is

superior

tribunal, the Utah Supreme Court. In the opinion of the
undersigned,
explanation

the COUNTY owes the Court
of

this

seemingly

a serious
intentional

misrepresentation.
CONCLUSION
The

"constitutional"

principles
24

announced

and

applied in Nollan and in Dolan are clear, concise and
unambiguous. The factual and "legal" setting behind
Nollan and Dolan are essentially "verbatim" to the
situation-at-hand. Those "constitutional" principles—
that a "taking" occurs by the coerced dedication and
improvement

of

real

development approval

estate,

as

conditioned

upon

are unchangeable, regardless of

the "legislative" or "administrative" distinctions the
COUNTY self-servingly argues for. The constitutions do
not make such a distinction; neither should this Court.
The

COUNTY

unconditionally so

concedes

albeit

not

quite

that the "administrative remand"

issue [certified Issue #2] was incorrectly decided by
the Court of Appeals. Except for such dispositive
analysis and/or holding as the Supreme Court deems
necessary to "fix" the problem (for "law of the case"
reasons), elaborate discussion is unnecessary.
The case should be remanded to the District Court
to enter judgment in favor of B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT,
consistent with the Nollan-Dolan standards.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March,
.

2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT to
be hand-delivered and/or mailed, first-class postage
prepaid, to the office of Mr Donald H Hansen, Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attorney, S-3400 Salt Lake
County Government Center, 2001 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84190, and to Mr Craig M Call, Private
Property Ombudsman, Department of Natural Resources,
P 0 Box 145610, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 30th
day of March, 2005.
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0RIG1KAL
STEPHEN G HOMER (153 6)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 1 8 20M

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

B.A.M, DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C,
a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff

APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR LEAVE OF • COURT
TO FILE "SUBSTITUTED"
PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,
Defendant

Case No. 20010840-CA

The Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.M/ DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
hereby respectfully moves the Court 'for leave to file a
"substituted" PETITION FOR REHEARING, to incorporate as
a basis for "rehearing" the provisions of Section 63-90a4, Utah Code, which provides in relevant part:
(b) The private property owner need not file
the appeal authorized by this section before
bringing an action in any court to adjudicate
claims that are eligible for appeal,
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the
action of a political subdivision does not
constitute, and may not be interpreted as
constituting, a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing
legal action.
Emphasis added.
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The

applicability

provisions
as

of

the

foregoing

statutory

seemingly unconsidered within the Decision

originally

published

by

the

Court

and

the

apparently-dispositive nature of such provisions in the
context of the Court's announced decision, was recently
(yesterday) brought to the undersigned's attention by
fellow practicing attorneys who became aware of the nowpublicized

"decision",

dissemination

now

subject

to

widespread

(Utah Advance Reports and/or Internet-

availability) following closure of the initial "petition
for rehearing" period wherein the original Petition was
timely filed.
Consideration of the new issue so raised in the
"substitute" Petition is meritorious on the grounds of
advising the Court of Appeals of a significant, perhaps
dispositive legal issue the original Decision seemingly
overlooked, to avoid additional undue delay and expense,
and/or to avoid the filing of a petition for certiorari
to the Utah Supreme Court to correct the apparent error
within that Decision.
The proposed "substitute" Petition to incorporate
the Section
prepared

and

63-9Qa-4
is

issue and arguments has been

attached

hereto.

The

proposed

"substitute" Petition has been modified to conform to the
page-limitations imposed by the Appellate Rules.

2

APPENDIX #1
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

APPENDIX #2
Court of Appeals' ORDER approving
"SUBSTITUTE" PETITION FOR REHEARING
[22 March 2004]

•tta*
Itf THE UTAff COORT OF APPEALS
00O00

B.A.M. Development, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ORDER
Case No. 20010840-CA

Salt Lake County, a Utah body
Politic and political
subdivision
of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion,
filed March 18, 2004 for leave to file a substituted petition for
rehearing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's motion is granted.
Appellant's substituted petition for rehearing filed on March 18,
2004 is accepted by the court.
Pursuant to Rule 35(a), of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellee is requested to file a response to
Appellant's Substituted Petition for Rehearing filed by the
Appellant. Appellee's response should comply with the
Requirements of Rule 35, and be filed within 14 days from the
3ate of this order.
Dated this %2 day of March, 2004,
FOR THE COURT:

/§^W^
Russell W. Bench, Judge

APPENDIX #2
PAfiF 1 OF 9 PA^tQ
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I hereby certify that on March 22, 2004, a t
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the
the parties Listed below:
DONALD H. HANSEN
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2001 S.STATE ST STE S3400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84190-1200
STEPHEN G. HOMER
ATTORNEY,AT LAW
9225-S REDWOOD RD
WEST* JORDAN UT 84088
Datedtthis March 22, 2004
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aMA^T

flX^/*^>J^\

J

Depufey Clerk
Cas^ No. 200108
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APPENDIX #3
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT "SUBSTITUTED" PETITION FOR REHEARING
[Utah Court of Appeals, 18 March 2 004]
[excerpts]
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, aMbody
politic and a*fpolitYcal
subdivision o'f the St:ate
of Utah,
Defendant-AppeiTee

APPELLANT'S

Appellate Case No. tf2T0010840-CA

PETITION FOR
[SUBSTITUTED]

REHEARING

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
The Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Judge

STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney at Law
922 5 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
DONALD H HANSEN
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney
S-3400 Salt Lake County Government Center
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C./
a Utah limited liability,
company,
APPELLANT'S.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
[SUBSTITUTED]

Plaintiff,
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,
Defendant

Case No. 20010840-CA

The Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.'M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.CW*
submits the following SUBSTITUTED APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING.
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The undersigned counsel certifies that this Petition
for Rehearing is filed .in good faith and not for purposes
of delay. On 8 March 2004 the Appellant originally filed'
the Petition for Rehearing which has not been decided.
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ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals decision, filed 20 February 2004
[hereinafter referred to as "the Decision"] , is in error
and should be withdrawn, re-worked and revised to address
and reflect the following issues and considerations.
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THE DECISION SEEMINGLY OVERLOOKS THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 63-90a-4, UTAH CODE
The Decision

disposing of the appeal on the basis

of the "lack of administrative record" issue, which issue
was not raised by the pleadinqs, tried in the District
Court nor briefed and araued on aooeal

seeminalv

overlooks the provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code,
wnich provides in relevant part:
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose
interest is subject to a physical takirigUor
exaction by a political subdivision may appeal
the political subdivision's decision within 30
days after the decision is made.
(ii) The legislative body of the
political
subdivision,
or
an
individual or body designated by them,
shall hear and approve or reject the
appeal within 14 days after it is
submitted,
(iii) If the legislative body of the
political subdivision fails to hear
and decide the appeal within 14 days,
the decision is presumed to be
approved
(b) The private property owner need not file
the appeal authorized by this section before
bringing an action in any court to adjudicate
claims that are eligible for appeal,
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the
action of a political subdivision does not
constitute. and may not be interpreted as
constituting/ a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing
legal action.
Emphasis added.
Although the Court is the ultimate arbiter as to the
interplay between apparently-conflicting statutes, the
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63-90a-4 provisions—not even cited in the Decision—
would seem to have dispositive significance to the "lack
of administrative record" issue.
If, for an "inverse condemnation" action such as
this, the property owner

[Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT] is not required—per Subsection 63-90a4(b)—to

file

an

appeal,

then

the

lack

of

any

"administrative record" cannot be a jurisdictional precondition to the filing and maintenance Of the action.*
Furthermore, the express provisions of Subsection
63-90a-4 (c)^ would seemingly OVERRIDE muchr--if not all
of the Court's discussion of the "lack of administrative
record" and "exhaustion" issues within the Decision.
On this latter point, the "specific1' statutory
provisions of 63-90a-4 being facially "directly on point"
with the "inverse condemnation" claims-at-hand would seem
to be controlling over the more "qeneral" statutory
provisions of 17-27-1001 the Decision has construed to be
dispositive. See Millett vs Clark Clinic Corporation, 609
P.2d

934

(Utah

Supreme

Court

1980)

["[W]here the

operation of two statutory provisions is in conflict,
that provision which is more specific in its application
will govern over that which is more general." 609 P. 2d at

x

The Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT did timely "appeal"
the County Commission, which refused to consider the "appea
4
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Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellee

APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
SUBSTITUTED PETITION FOR REHEARING
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
David E. Yocom
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Donald H. Hansen
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee
2001 South State Street, No. S3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1200
Stephen G. Homer
Attorneyfor Appellant
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan UT 84088
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County
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Telephone: (801) 468-2631
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
B.A.M.iDEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
SUBSTITUTED PETITION FOR
REHEARING

Appellant/Plaintiff
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Court of Appeals No. 20010840-CA
Trial Court Civil No. 980908157 CD

Appellee/Defendant

The Appellee/Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY ["County"] by and through its
undersigned counsel of record, Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney for the Salt Lake
County District Attorney's Office, hereby submits its Memorandum in Response to
Appellant's Substituted Petition for Rehearing, filed March 18,2004 by Appellant/Plaintiff
B.A.M. Development, LLC ["BAM"].
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INTRODUCTION
Rehearing in this Court limited to instances where the petitioner demonstrates "points
of law or fact which ... the court has overlooked or misapprehended." URAP, Rule 35(a).
As discussed below, BAM has not demonstrated that the this Court overlooked or
misapprehended any relevant law or fact; it simply disagrees with the majority decision.
Thus, its petition for rehearing is not well taken.
1.

Utah Code Ann., Sec. 63-90a-4 Has No Relevance to this Case

BAM argues that the Court has apparently "overlooked" Utah Code Ann., Sec. 6390a-1., et. seq. in its Decision. BAM states that its counsel recently became aware of the
"apparently dispositive nature" of Section 63-90a-4 when the statute was "brought to
[BAM's attorney's] attention by fellow practicing attorneys...." See, BAM's Motion for
Leave of Court to file "Substituted" Petition for Rehearing, p. 2. In its "substituted" petition
for rehearing ["Aplnt's Petition"], BAM places great weight on the statute as having
"controlling status" over Sec. 17-27-1001. Petition, pp. 3 - 5. The Court of Appeals relied
upon the latter section for its holding that district court review of the County's land use
decision in this case {i.e., approving BAM's subdivision plan subject to a required dedication
of land for highway right-of-way) is limited to review of a record generated at the county
administrative level. The necessary concomitant of this holding is that under Sec. 17-271001(3)(a), the County should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on BAM's appeal of
the dedication requirement, and created a record for review by the district court. See, B.AM.
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Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2004 WL 316141 (Utah App.) ("Decision"),ffi[9 15,17. BAM now argues that Sec. 63-90a-4(b) "overrides" the hearing and recordmaking
requirements which this court read into Sec. 17-27-1001. Aplnt's Motion, at 4.
BAM misapprehends the purpose and function of Sec. 63-90a-4(b). That statues does
not relate to an administrative appeal of adverse land use decision of a county's planning
commission or board of adjustment. Rather, it relates solely to the availability of, and
procedure for seeking, administrative relief in claims of constitutional takings. Sec. 63-90a-4
is part of a statute, enacted in 1994, entitled "Constitutional Takings Issues." Significantly,
in its present motion, BAM omits any reference to subsection (1) of Sec. 63-90a-4, which
provides:
(1)

"Each political subdivision1 shall enact an ordinance that:
(a)
establishes a procedure for review of actions that may have
constitutional taking issues and
(b)

meets the requirements of this section."

BAM reads subsection(2)(b), which provides that "[t]he private property owner need
not file the appeal authorized by this section before bringing an action in court to adjudicate
claims that are eligible for appeal," in complete isolation, without regard to the limited
underlying purpose and scope of the statute. By focusing solely on the foregoing provision,
BAM ignores the function and intent of the Constitutional Taking Issues statute. It is
axiomatic that "the plain language of a statute is to read as a whole and it provisions
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute ...." See, e.g., Thomas v.
u<

Political subdivisions" include counties. Sec. 63-90a-l(2).
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Color County Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added; internal
citations omitted). Here, BAM fails to so read Sec. 63-90a-4.
The statute was designed to provide a framework for speedy and inexpensive
administrative consideration of takings claims asserted by private property owners at the
local political subdivision level. In accordance with the statute's mandate that political
subdivisions "shall enact an ordinance2," Salt Lake County adopted its "takings relief
ordinance3 ["the Ordinance"] in 1999. In its preliminary findings, the Ordinance notes as
follows:
"In the event an owner of private property within the unincorporated area of
the county claims that the application or enforcement of county zoning
ordinances or other land use regulation constitutes an unconslitutional taking
of its private property, it is in the best interest of the county to have established
procedures for obtaining relevant information for analyzing such claim and
determining whether it might be appropriate to grant certain relief to the
claimant, rather than conducting such analysis in a more confrontational,
expensive and time-consuming litigation context."
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 19.93.020 B (emphasis added). The Ordinance
then establishes a comprehensive procedure whereby a property owner may (but is not
required to) file a petition for relief. Id., Sec. 19.93,030. After preliminary administrative
review, the procedures under the Ordinance include the appointment of an independent
heanng officer to conduct a public hearing and make recommendations to the county

2

Sec. 63-90a-4(l).

3

Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 19.93.010, et. seq. ("Procedures for
Analyzing Takings Claims"). (Copy attached hereto as Exhibit "A")
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administrative remedies."

Accordingly, then, while an aggrieved property owner must

exhaust administrative remedies with respect to a county's land use decision (contrary to
BAM's unsupported assertion8, a "land use decision" includes conditions and restrictions
which a county may attach to a subdivision approval9) in order to obtain a "final land use
decision" from which appeal may be taken to district court10, that does not mean that an
administrative petition for "takings relief1 under a county's ordinance is a prerequisite to
judicial review. Simply put, the former procedure is mandatory; the latter is optional.
In its present petition, BAM confuses the two avenues of administrative review. Thus,
there is no "conflict" between the two statutes, and Sec. 63-90a-4 does not "override" Sec.
17-27-1001, as BAM argues. Rather, the former supplements the latter by providing an
additional - but not required - vehicle for seeking relief from an alleged taking of private
property. This view harmonizes Sec. 17-27-1001 with Sec. 63-90a-4(c) which provides that
"[a] property owner's failure to appeal the action of a political subdivision
%

See, Aplnt's Petition, pp. 5-11.

9

Sec. 17-27-100 l(2)(a) provides that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision
made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter mayfilea petition for
review of the decision with the district court...." (Emphasis added). The foregoing phrase
"provisions of this chapter" includes the provisions of Sec. 17-27-801, et seq., which governs
subdivision approvals. Hence, a county's conditional approval of a developer's subdivision plat
is clearly a "land use decision" within the ambit of the appeals provisions of Sec. 17-27-1001.
l0

It is fundamental doctrine of takings jurisprudence that before judicial review of a local
land use decision will be entertained, there must be a "final decision" of the local land use
authority. That is, before a takings claim may be addressed by a court,"... the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reach afinaldecision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
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governing body (i.e., the County Council). Id., Sec. 19.93.040 B. The Council then is
required to review the hearing officer's recommendations and approve or deny the claimant's
petition, and may hold a further public hearing to receive any new evidence.

Id., Sec.

19.93.040 J.
The state statute, and the corollary county ordinance, simply create an optional
procedure by which a property owner may administratively assert a takings claim. The
procedure, however, is strictly at the option of the private property owner. This is the
rationale underlying the provision of the statute - which is the sole focus of BAM's present
motion - that "[t]he private property owner need not file the appeal authorized by this
section before bringing an action in any court.... "
The problem with BAM's view of Sec. 63-90a-4 is that BAM treats that statute as
"conflicting"5 with and "controlling"6 over Sec. 17-27-1001 when, in reality, the two
provisions are entirely separate and distinct in their function and purpose. The provisions
of Sec. 17-27-1001 require an administrative appeal procedure for persons adversely affected
by county land use decisions7. Sec. 17-27-1001(1) provides that "[n]o person may challenge
in district court a county's land use decision ... until that person has exhausted all
4

Sec. 63-90a-4(b).

*Aplnt's Petition, p. 4.
6

/tf.,p.5.

7

For example, in Salt Lake County, the administrative appeal of an adverse decision of
the planning commission respecting a subdivision application is heard by the county council.
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 18.08.050.
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does not constitute, an may not interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies or a bar to bringing legal action."
In short, BAM's argument, founded upon its narrow, isolated reading of Sec. 63-90a4(2)(b), is not even related to - much less "dispositive" of- the administrative hearing and
recordmaking requirements enunciated by the Court of Appeals' decision. BAM seemingly
is comparing proverbial apples an oranges in an effort to find a "conflicting" and
"controlling" statute under which the court might reevaluate its decision. Accordingly,
BAM's present motion should be denied.
2.

BAM's Action is an Appeal of a Land Use Decision

BAM next argues that its district court action was not, and should not be treated as,
an appeal of a county land use decision subject to the provisions of Sec. 17-27-1001. Aplnt's
Petition, pp. 5-9. BAM attempts to distinguish its action as one for inverse condemnation,
and not a land use appeal.
Simply put, it is both. While BAM's theory of recovery is that county action resulted
in an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation, the County
action giving rise to this claim is its final land use decision which conditioned BAM's
subdivision approval on the dedication of land for highway right-of-way. BAM itself appears
to have recognized Sec. 17-27-1001 as governing its appeal, inasmuch as it filed its action
in district court within the required thirty (30) day period allowed for appeal after the
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whereas Sec. 17-27-1001 provides the exclusive procedure for seeking district court review
of a county land use decision.
BAM has not shown any error in the majority's reasoning or authority, and no
"overlooked or misapprehended" law or fact. BAM simply doesn't like the majority opinion,
and wants the Court to reverse itself. The Decision reasonably construes Sec. 17-27-1001 and
its analysis represents a sensible, rational scheme for administrative hearing and
recordmaking, followed by limited district court review.
Accordingly, BAM has not satisfied the standards for rehearing set forth at URAP Rule
35(a), and its present petition should be denied.
Dated this March 30,2004.

DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

DOTOANSEN
Deputy District Attorney
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